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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the second most important industrial crop in Ghana, 
oil palm holds the potential of improving farmers’ 
livelihoods and alleviating rural poverty. However, 
this transformative potential is unrealised because 
most smallholders are unable to reap the benefits of 
commercialisation owing to lack of resources. For 
such farmers, collective action through farmer-based 
organisations (FBOs) could provide a pathway to 
inclusive participation in agricultural commercialisation. 
There is ample evidence in the literature that collective 
action can help smallholders gain access to credit, 
improved inputs, or even networks of social support. 
Thus, collective action is widely recognised as a viable 
pathway out of poverty for the agrarian poor. For 
poor farmers who lack the capacity to independently 
respond to the risks of commercialisation, participating 
in collective action schemes such as FBOs can help 
overcome the constraints that their individual resources 
would be insufficient for by reducing transaction costs, 
enabling access to inputs and credit, and overcoming 
market constraints. 
This paper draws on qualitative data collected as a 
follow-up to the quantitative baseline survey conducted 
as part of the Ghana Work Stream 1 package of the 
Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) consortium 
in the Ahanta West and Mpohor districts of the 
Western Region. Building on preliminary insights from 
the quantitative study, we sampled five communities 
based on the dominant marketing outlets identified in 
the quantitative data – i.e., commercial engagement 
with Benso Oil Palm Plantation (BOPP), Norpalm Ghana 
Ltd. (NGL), Building Business on Values, Integrity, and 
Dignity (B-BOVID), and independent sales (on the open 
market or to artisanal processors). In each community, 
we sampled at least five heads of household. At the 
household level, we conducted interviews with each 
household head, which lasted for an average of one 
hour, and complemented these with shorter interviews 
with spouses and dependents. We also conducted two 
focus group discussions (FGDs) separately for males 
and females in each community. At the district level, we 
conducted expert interviews with district agricultural 
officers of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA). 
Finally, we interviewed management-level employees 
at BOPP, NGL, and B-BOVID.
In all five communities, FBOs were either weak or 
non-existent. Indeed, we find that economic relations 
between farmers tend to be more individualised 
than one would expect to find in rural communities, 
resulting from the personal or financial cost of 
cooperation, unrealistic expectations of FBOs, and 
mistrust stemming from poor internal governance. 
Without any strong association, farmers are left with no 
organisational vehicle to collectively negotiate prices or 
acquire productivity-enhancing technology. Wealthier 
farmers are able to overcome this disadvantage 
by independently pooling resources with similarly 
endowed farmers to engage in income-enhancing 
activities, such as sharing the cost of direct sales 
to the oil palm companies (OPCs), or investing in 
processing technology. This situation is particularly 
disadvantageous for poorer farmers, because it 
hinders their ability to benefit from the advantages of 
agricultural commercialisation. In particular, a strong 
association or cooperative could have enabled them 
to overcome the lack of resources which limits their 
individual abilities for profitable market participation. 
The expectation that FBOs can help poor farmers 
overcome obstacles to profitable commercialisation is 
based on analytical insights from the collective action 
and social capital literatures, which postulate that the 
social networks contain a rich store of resources which 
can be tapped into to improve individual lives and 
empower communities. However, our findings indicate 
that material hardship is an important obstacle in many 
of these abortive collective endeavours. Although 
they are aware of the benefits of effectively nurturing 
social networks and collective action, lack of material 
autonomy forces them to make short term survival 
decisions. This lack of autonomy undermines their 
ability to generate or nurture trust. Without trust, FBOs 
lack any means of ensuring the implementation of 
collective decisions requiring voluntaristic compliance. 
The resulting mistrust further engenders disinterest 
and apathy in the affairs of the association. This can 
result in a vicious circle, where wealth disparities widen 
in a community because the material prerequisites 
for participating in livelihood-enhancing collective 
schemes end up excluding exactly those who need 
such schemes the most.
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Agricultural commercialisation provides a pathway out 
of poverty for rural households by increasing access 
to improved inputs, and helping farmers increase 
their incomes by scaling up their operations. Beyond 
these positive effects at the micro level, agricultural 
commercialisation is expected to lead to positive 
externalities in the local agrarian economy, ultimately 
contributing to transformation at the community 
level (Poulton, 2017). However, after over a century 
of commercialised cultivation of oil palm production, 
the expected improvements in the livelihoods of 
smallholder farmers and the national economy have 
not materialised. The reasons for this are multifarious, 
ranging from historical and political reasons that inhibit 
the effectiveness of policies targeting the sector (Teye 
and Torvikey, 2018; Asante, 2021), to community- 
and household-level factors that explain why some 
smallholder households are unable to realise the 
welfare-enhancing potential of participating in oil palm 
commercialisation (Dzanku et al., 2020; Saha, Sabates-
Wheeler and Thompson, 2021).
These studies suggest that the ability of agricultural 
commercialisation to improve farmers’ livelihoods 
does not occur automatically. Dzanku et al. (2020) 
found that smallholder oil palm farmers who derived 
the most benefit from agricultural commercialisation 
were already better off on measures such as farm size, 
tenure security, income from off-farm employment, 
and asset-ownership. Indeed, asset holding is 
crucial in Saha, Sabates-Wheeler and Thompson’s 
(2021, p. 3) definition of smallholders’ ‘capacity for 
commercialisation’ because it shapes their ability ‘to 
respond to the risks from commercialisation’.
For poor farmers who lack the capacity to independently 
respond to the risks of commercialisation, participating 
in collective action schemes such as FBOs can help 
them overcome the constraints that their individual 
resources would be insufficient for. There is ample 
evidence in the literature that collective action can 
help smallholder farmers to overcome obstacles to 
commercialisation by reducing transaction costs, 
enabling access to inputs and credit, and overcoming 
market constrains (Francesconi & Ruben, 2007; 
Markelova et al., 2009; Nyikahadzoi et al., 2011; Fischer 
& Qaim, 2014; Kibirige, 2016).
However, collective action schemes are not always an 
option for the poorest farmers. We find that whereas 
FBOs can serve as conduits of important market 
information and can help farmers to access input and 
output markets, as well as training and other services, 
they were either weak or non-existent in the study 
communities. This situation is partially accounted for 
by the inability of poorer farmers to meet their financial 
obligations to their associations, as well as mistrust 
stemming from a history of unaccountable leadership 
of these associations. Under these circumstances, 
cooperation tends to be limited to small groups of better-
off farmers, where it is easier to ensure compliance.
This paper examines smallholder farmers’ 
participation in farmer-based associations in five oil 
palm growing communities in the Western Region. 
We examine the roles these organisations (are 
expected to) play and the factors which affect their 
abilities to do so effectively. A central insight from our 
study can be summarised in the quip: poverty is the 
cause of poverty, i.e., the poor, who stand to gain 
the most from trustful relations, are unable to nurture 
trust because resource constraints compel them to 
take short-term decisions, which in turn undermine 
collective action. The ultimate result is that farmers in 
the study communities are forced to participate in the 
market on an extremely individualistic bases, without 
any protection from market or state failures. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the 
next section reviews the literature on agricultural 
commercialisation and collective action. The third 
section briefly describes the methods, and the fourth 
section presents the findings. The first part of the 
findings examines the quality of social relations in 
the study communities, paying particular attention to 
issues of trust, or the lack thereof, while the second 
part focuses on the strength of associational life. The 
final section concludes with brief reflections on social 
capital and the material bases of trust.
1 INTRODUCTION
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According to Poulton (2017, p. 4) agricultural 
commercialisation ‘occurs when agricultural 
enterprises and/or the agricultural sector as a whole 
rely increasingly on the market for the sale of produce 
and for the acquisition of inputs, including labour.’ To 
this end, the market drive plays a pivotal role in the 
defining features of agricultural commercialisation. 
This involves redirecting productive efforts from semi-
subsistence towards production for local, national, and 
international markets (Dorward and Kydd, 2002).
The drive for agricultural commercialisation is expected 
to result in improved livelihoods at the household 
and national levels (von Braun, 1995; Kibirige, 2016; 
Poulton, 2017; Cazzuffi et al., 2020), and in some 
developed and developing countries has proven to 
be efficient in driving industrial and economic growth. 
For instance, Kibirige (2016) observed that large-scale 
agricultural commercialisation, which employs the use 
of sophisticated technologies and modern machinery, 
has contributed largely to economic and industrial 
growth of developed countries. Successful agricultural 
commercialisation directly creates employment 
and augments agricultural labour productivity (von 
Braun, 1995). Large-scale farms and their associated 
processing operations often create spill-over effects or 
employment for members of smallholder households in 
surrounding areas (Poulton, 2017; Cazzuffi et al., 2020)
However, there are several barriers that prevent 
smallholder farmers from reaping the benefits of 
agricultural commercialisation. Rooted in lack of 
financial means, these barriers include small farm sizes, 
poor cash flow, and lack of access to improved inputs, 
among others (Arias et al., 2013). In general, smallholder 
farmers are unable to make the investment necessary 
to scale up production because they are denied credit 
facilities based on their ‘household demographics, 
socioeconomic and farm characteristics’ as well as 
their inability to provide collateral (Mutero, Munapo 
and Seaketso, 2016, p. 41). Furthermore, smallholder 
farmers are more likely to have limited access to 
farming and market information (Mutero, Munapo and 
Seaketso, 2016). However, by engaging in collective 
action, smallholder farmers can overcome these 
obstacles to successful commercialisation.
2.1 Collective action and the question 
of trust
Collective action depends on people’s willingness 
to subordinate their narrow individual interests for 
communal ends, ostensibly in order to reap potentially 
greater benefits of a joint effort. The concept provides 
an analytical lens for studying organisational activities 
across multiple social contexts, from grassroots 
mobilisation to national and transnational organisation 
and coordination (Tilly, 1985; Valdez, 2011; Clément, 
2015; Schulze-Cleven, 2017). Voluntary associations 
serve as important vehicles for collective action by 
bringing together different social groups and are, thus, 
considered vital to sustaining modern democratic 
societies and promoting income-generating activities 
among the poor (Putnam, 2000; Pfaff and Valdez, 
2011). 
In developing countries characterised by weak or 
inefficient state institutions and imperfect markets, 
collective action is understood to play an even more 
crucial role. In agrarian communities where failures 
of state and markets severely curtail access to 
roads, schools, health facilities, and potable water, 
grassroots organisations can enable community 
members to work together to overcome some of 
these problems. For instance, farmers can reduce 
costs by pooling resources to transport their goods to 
marketing centres or establishing savings schemes to 
compensate for lack of access to credit from formal 
financial institutions (Markelova et al., 2009). A recent 
review by Tirivayi et al., (2018) concludes that there is 
a strong potential for voluntary associations like forest-
producer organisations to contribute to the expansion 
of access to social protection among underserved 
rural populations, through their provision of informal 
insurance and social services to community members. 
Consequently, collective action has been proposed as 
a viable pathway out of poverty for rural households.
Social capital is a crucial ingredient in any collective 
action scheme. It has been defined as the network of 
relationships among social actors, and the benefits that 
derive from these relationships (Portes, 1998; Aldrich 
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and Meyer, 2015). Social capital enables communities 
to collectively mobilise to confront a range of material 
threats to lives and livelihoods (Warren, Thompson and 
Saegert, 2001; Adger, 2003), as well as problems arising 
from unequal institutional and power arrangements 
(Mwangi and Markelova, 2009). Social capital is crucial 
because it is ‘the interdependence of agents through 
their relationships with each other’ (Adger, 2003, p. 
388) through which individuals and communities can 
effectively confront the threats to their livelihoods. 
Nevertheless, it is shaped by the structures of social 
relations in which it is embedded.
Studies on agrarian communities also show that social 
capital is associated with a variety of positive livelihood 
outcomes among smallholder farmers. A review of 
studies on agricultural productivity in Nigeria shows 
that farmers who participate in informal organisations 
have more access to informal credit and tend to 
have higher levels of productivity (Liverpool-Tasie, 
Kuku and Ajibola, 2011). Similar outcomes have been 
observed in Uganda, where households with higher 
levels of social capital are more likely to participate 
in collective farming and to exercise greater agency 
in market transactions. Moreover, social capital 
contributed to women’s empowerment by bolstering 
their ability to accumulate assets and participate in 
collective decision-making (Abenakyo et al., 2008). In 
ecologically fragile contexts, social capital has been 
shown to be related to smallholder farmers’ choice 
of different adaptive strategies in response to climate 
change (Yaméogo, Fonta and Wünscher, 2018).
Studies in Ghana have found that social capital can 
enable farmers to overcome individual constraints 
through increased access to social and material 
support (Wuepper and Sauer, 2016). Networks of trust 
within and between communities and other actors, like 
traders, government agencies, and aid organisations, 
have been shown to improve access to tractor-based 
mechanised farming among farmers in northern Ghana. 
By drawing on the resources inherent in their networks, 
some smallholder farmers are able ‘first to purchase 
personal tractors and second, to gain timely access to 
tractor-hire ploughing services at the community level’ 
(Kansanga, 2017, p. 718).
However, many other studies (see Cleaver, 2005; Offer, 
2012; Koutsou, Partalidou and Ragkos, 2014; Fonte 
and Cucco, 2017) caution against both analytical and 
programmatic over-dependence on social capital to 
fill the gap left by market and state failure. In many 
places, participation in farmer groups for collective 
action remains low, owing to low levels of social capital 
(Koutsou, Partalidou and Ragkos, 2014). The strength 
and cohesiveness of associational life is predicated on 
the quality of interpersonal social relations (van Rijn, 
Bulte and Adekunle, 2012).
Trust is, thus, a very important, though often 
overlooked, element of social capital (Fu, 2004). Trust 
lays the foundation for cooperation and reciprocity 
(Siisianen, 1999). In fact, interpersonal trust is so 
important to the ongoing existence of networks that 
groups develop various mechanisms for monitoring 
behaviour and enforcing compliance to group 
norms. These mechanisms range in intensity from 
informal socialisation and ridicule on one extreme, to 
more severe actions like social ostracism and even 
banishment on the other (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 
1993). Hence, the view that social capital is a blank 
cheque that members of a community can draw on 
at will with little or no expense to themselves is more 
romantic than realistic. Indeed, studies have shown 
that in some instances, entrepreneurs may prefer 
to escape whatever comforts or material supports 
their communities provide if they find the reciprocal 
expectations from the communities to be too onerous 
or constrictive (Portes, 1998; Asante, 2018).
This implies that social capital is not equally available 
to all members of a community. Since material 
resources are unequally distributed, the ability to 
engender and maintain trust will also be unequally 
distributed in any community. This situation puts 
resource-poor actors at a marked disadvantage, 
because their material circumstances predispose 
them to short-term economic calculations, which 
in long-term economic relationships, can place the 
other party at a disadvantage, and thus destroy the 
basis for subsequent cooperation. In fact, in some 
instances, adverse incorporation in social networks 
can trap the poorest in chronic poverty by forcing them 
to accumulate reciprocal obligations that absorb all 
disposable income and make it impossible for them to 
acquire assets or invest in income-generating activities 
(Hickey and Du Toit, 2013).
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This paper draws on qualitative data collected as a 
follow-up to the quantitative baseline survey conducted 
as part of the Ghana Work Stream 1 package of the 
APRA consortium in the Ahanta West and Mpohor 
districts of the Western Region (see Dzanku and 
Hodey, 2019 for more details on the quantitative 
design). Building on preliminary insights from the 
quantitative study, we sampled four communities 
based on the dominant marketing outlets identified in 
the quantitative data – i.e., commercial engagement 
with BOPP, NGL, B-BOVID, and independent sales 
(on the open market or to artisanal processors). We 
also selected a fifth community that combined all four 
commercialisation channels. The selected communities 
are Adum Dominase (BOPP), Butre (Independent), 
Kwesikrom (NGL), New Akwidaa (Mixed), Pretsea 
(B-BOVID). Farming is the main economic activity in 
these communities, but other activities like oil palm 
processing and tricycle transportation provide off-farm 
livelihood opportunities (see Table 3.1).
The quantitative study found differences among 
farmers based on their mode of participation in the 
oil palm economy. Upon harvest, farmers choose 
one or a combination of the following channels of 
market participation: (1) direct sales to OPCs, like 
BOPP and NGL; (2) sales to OPCs through agents or 
intermediaries; (3) independent sales on local market; 
and (4) processing own output. However, farmers differ 
in their ability to access the various commercialisation 
channels. For instance, those who sell directly to 
companies are more likely to have working capital, 
higher levels of education, and access to paved 
roads. On the other hand, those selling through 
intermediaries tend to have fewer options compared 
to the first group. Farmers who are not wealthy enough 
to sell directly to the companies, and are unwilling to 
engage with intermediaries, can sidestep the formal 
market altogether and instead sell to market women 
or process their own fruits. Own processing is almost 
as profitable as selling directly to the companies, but 
requires initial capital outlay which most farmers do not 
have (Dzanku et al., 2020, p. 15).
The qualitative follow-up further interrogated some 
of these findings. In each community, we sampled 
at least five heads-of-household. At the household 
level, we conducted interviews with each household 
head, which lasted for an average of one hour, and 
complemented these with shorter interviews with 
spouses and dependents. In our sample, female heads-
of-households tended to be divorced or widowed, 
hence there was no spouse to be interviewed. We 
also interviewed key actors in the oil palm economy 
in each community, including farm hands or workers, 
aggregators or buying agents, and artisanal processors. 
In each community, we also conducted key informant 
interviews with chiefs and other local leaders, such 
as unit committee chairs or assembly members. We 
conducted two FGDs separately for males and females 
in each community. At the district level, we conducted 
expert interviews with district agricultural officers of 
the MoFA in Mpohor and Ahanta West. Finally, we 
interviewed management level employees at BOPP, 
NGL, and B-BOVID. Fieldwork was conducted by a 
team of six field assistants and two supervisors, and 
lasted for two weeks. The data was subsequently 
transcribed and analysed using the Atlas.ti CAQDA. 
This paper largely draws on the farmer subsample of 
the qualitative data.
3 METHODS
Table 3.1: Some characteristics of study communities
District Ahanta West Mpohor (Wassa East)
Communities New Akwidaa Pretea Kwesikrom Adum Dominase Butre
Dominant 
marketing outlets




and oil palm), 
fishing, tricycle 
(transport)
Farming (oil palm), 
tricycle (transport)
Farming (oil palm 
and okra), tricycle 
(transport)
Farming (cocoa 
and oil palm), 
tricycle (transport)
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FBOs are crucial in the lives of farmers and farming 
communities. The literature (Koutsou, Partalidou and 
Ragkos, 2014; Tregear and Cooper, 2016; Fonte and 
Cucco, 2017; Kansanga, 2017; Wynne-Jones, 2017) 
suggests that FBOs play three major roles, namely: 1) 
education and information dissemination on improved 
farming practices and income generating activities; 
2) mediation on issues such as access to credit, 
price-setting, and market access; and 3) conviviality 
and social support. However, whether or not a FBO 
performs these roles, and the extent to which it does, 
depends on a variety of factors. An important factor 
concerns the source of initiative in establishing the FBO. 
In the most recent survey of FBOs in Ghana, Salifu and 
Funk (2012) observe that almost 60 per cent of FBOs in 
Ghana were initiated externally, usually by agricultural 
extension agents (AEAs) who set them up to streamline 
their extension activities or to provide a vehicle through 
which farmers could receive support from government 
or non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
For smallholders who lack individual access to the 
resources necessary to participate in high-value 
markets, FBOs provide a means by which they may 
reap the benefits of agricultural commercialisation 
from which they may otherwise be cut off. In our study 
communities, these associations tend to be weak or 
non-existent. This often resulted from the inability of the 
organisations to deliver on the expectations of material 
or other support which the FBO’s establishment had 
generated. Although they received training on good 
agronomic practices through their FBOs, the farmers 
complained that they are yet to see the benefit of 
these training programmes. For instance, they insisted 
that although they fully understood the importance 
of adhering to safety standards on their farms, they 
could not practically ensure this because they lacked 
the resources to procure protective materials such 
as boots, gloves, nose masks, and helmets. This is 
expressed by a female farmer as follows:
BOPP often sends some workers here to teach 
us how to do pruning and other activities…. 
They just say that, but give us nothing to do the 
pruning. They have taught us everything from 
cultivation, maintenance, harvesting and even 
carrying it to the roadside, but we have not 
received anything from them to date. (Female 
FGD, Adum Dominase, 24th April, 2019)
Associations could help farmers collectively overcome 
obstacles to productivity and, thereby, improve the 
livelihoods of households that participate in farmer 
organisations. An important obstacle to boosting 
productivity among smallholders is their inability to 
adopt or take advantage of mechanisation. While 
adoption of mechanisation may be out of the reach of 
individual farmers, they stand the chance of benefiting 
from collective mechanisation schemes (Kansanga, 
2017). Findings from the quantitative survey (Dzanku 
and Hodey, 2019; Dzanku et. al., 2020) show that 
artisanal processing was more profitable and welfare-
enhancing than selling of raw fruits to either the 
OPCs or on the open market. Artisanal processing 
also helped farmers to prevent wastage (especially 
in peak seasons when the OPCs have more supply 
than needed), hedge against low prices, and to take 
advantage of increased prices in the lean season 
(Dzanku et al., 2020). However, owing to the weakness 
of FBOs in the study communities, there was virtually 
no collective effort in any of the study communities to 
collectively engage in artisanal processing.
Associations are also expected to negotiate for better 
prices and other incentives for producers (Fonte and 
Cucco, 2017). Farmers in the study communities had 
derived this benefit from their associations in the past, 
when their FBOs had mediated between them and 
outside organisations like the government or OPCs on 
issues such as pricing and sales arrangements. While 
much of this mediation had not happened in the study 
communities in recent years, many farmers asserted 
that they will be better off with collective action in 
pursuit of better prices, sales arrangements, access 
to credit and access to mechanisation in production 
and processing.
You know the kind of farming we do here we 
don’t have any association that regulates 
things…. People quote the price at which they 
want to buy your products. If you say you will 
not sell it to them it will go waste. So our work 
as farmers is sometimes very difficult. (Male 
farmer, Pretsea, 15th April, 2019)
4 ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE IN THE STUDY 
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All oil palm farmers in Ghana can form an 
association and determine the price. We can 
have a negotiation with the company and get a 
fixed price that will apply to the sale of oil palm 
everywhere in Ghana. But we don’t have that in 
this country. (Male FGD, Adum Dominase, 24th 
April, 2019)
Smallholder farming is greatly challenged by factors, 
such as access to credit, which hinder the development 
of agribusinesses. Measures to develop agriculture in 
Africa and elsewhere have placed access to credit at 
the centre, in the environment of strengthened farmer 
groups to share knowledge and improve the productive 
use of such credit facilities (Kasanga, 2017). Farmers 
attribute their inability to step up their productivity 
partly to the absence of strong associations:
…the farmers here do not have an association. 
If we had an association, we would have been 
able to push for some of these incentives 
because the government mostly listen to an 
organised group of people rather than an 
individual. (Female FGD, Butre, 25th April, 2019)
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The failure of farmers in the study communities to 
collectively organise to solve the common problems 
that confront them can be explained by a number 
of factors, including the personal or financial cost of 
cooperation, unrealistic expectations of the FBOs, 
and mistrust stemming from poor internal governance. 
First, such associations thrive on members’ financial 
contributions. However, due to the inability of some 
farmers to make such contributions, the activities 
of the association gradually come to a standstill, 
eventually leading to collapse. One such association 
in Adum Dominase collapsed partly because ‘some 
members were not paying dues as they ought to’ (Male 
farmer, Adum Dominase, 18th April 2019). While many 
farmers genuinely lacked the means to pay, the fact 
that a large enough number of farmers defaulted on 
payment led to a free-rider problem, where even those 
who could afford to pay refused to do so because 
they believed others were not contributing their fair 
share. As another respondent in the same community 
bluntly put it, his association collapsed because ‘some 
people wanted to reap off others’ (Male farmer, Adum 
Dominase, 18th April 2019). 
Similarly, collective decisions, such as a sales boycott 
meant to drive up prices, can sometimes impose a 
stiff financial cost on poorer farmers. Where such 
endeavours require the adherence of all involved to 
ensure success, poorer farmers become the weakest 
links. For instance, a collective decision in one of 
the communities to withhold their produce until the 
price improves was thwarted by poorer farmers 
who urgently need cash and could not stick to the 
agreement long enough:
We can agree to say we will accept the price 
at which the buyers buy our palm fruits, but 
someone in Yawkow would just go and accept 
the same [old] amount and we wouldn’t even 
know. That would mean he is undermining the 
decision we had all agreed on (Male farmer, 
Kwesikrom, 20th April, 2019)
A second reason for the weakness of FBOs was the 
disparity between the high expectations that farmers 
had of receiving immediate material benefits, and the 
reality once they joined. The high expectations are partly 
due to the fact that most of these FBOs were initiated 
by external actors like AEAs, NGOs, government 
agencies or OPCs. Disillusionment at the failure of the 
associations to deliver the expected material rewards 
was a common theme in respondents’ account of why 
their associations ultimately failed:
I think it collapsed because some members 
were not paying dues as they ought to. Also, 
members were disappointed in BOPP and the 
other NGOs as they were expecting support in 
terms of money, which was not coming. (Male 
farmer, Adum Dominase, 18th April, 2019)
Here, it is not common to see associations… 
associations do not survive here. Sometimes 
they tell us that they will bring farmers some 
things but nothing happens. (Male farmer, 
Butre, 23rd April, 2019)
This particular government brought some 
seedlings to us to cultivate with the promise 
that they will assist us in weeding around it, but 
this promise and others were not fulfilled. We 
have been working with our own strength all 
these years. They didn’t even give us machetes 
and other tools to farm the oil palm. The same 
thing happened four years ago, they promised 
to bring farmers money that never came. All my 
children have left the house and my wife and I 
are too old to do all this work. (Male FGD, New 
Akwidaa, 23rd April 2019)
Moreover, associations were internally fragmented by 
mistrust bred by widespread suspicions of financial 
malfeasance by the executives. There appears to be no 
rigorous mechanism to stop exploitation by leaders of 
these associations. Respondents recounted numerous 
instances of blatant misuse of associations’ resources, 
the most extreme example of which emerged during a 
focus group:
[All] that they said they will give to us, one Mr. B—, 
he was the head in this area, he took it all and 
squandered it. He committed suicide when the 
government began an audit. So all the benefits 
were lost to the farmers and we have had to rely 
on our individual resources since 2006. (Male 
FGD, New Akwidaa, 23rd April 2019)
5 FACTORS SHAPING ASSOCIATIONAL 
QUALITY
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Such instances of malfeasance reinforce the already-
widespread suspicion against any attempt at collective 
action. In a social context where collective action 
already imposes high costs on individual farmers, 
corruption and misuse of resources by FBO executives 
substantially dampens enthusiasm in associational 
life. There, thus, seems to be a general apathy among 
the farmers in matters of communal organisations, 
collective action, and associations.
5.1 The importance of autonomy and 
trust
As the above analysis suggests, economic relations 
between farmers tended to be more individualised 
than one would expect to find in rural communities. 
As one farmer put it when explaining the absence of a 
FBO in his community: ‘…there is no communication. 
Every farmer manages his own farm. We do not have 
any farmers’ association that we belong [to here]’ 
(Male farmer, Butre, 18th April, 2019). Lack of financial 
means is an important obstacle in many of these 
abortive endeavours at collective action in the study 
communities. Failure of members to meet financial 
obligations have often hindered the success of group 
efforts. In Kwesikrom, farmers decided to contribute 
towards the purchase of an oil palm processor for the 
community, which would have enabled them to derive 
higher incomes than selling the raw fruits. However, 
as one respondent explained (Male FGD, Kwesikrom, 
23rd April, 2019), ‘… [some] people failed to pay the 
little contributions [needed to purchase a processing 
unit],’ and the plan ultimately failed.
This situation further pushed farmers into increasingly 
atomised behaviour. Many farmers were tempted to 
explain this lack of cooperative spirit as a moral failure 
attributable to the character of individual farmers:
We are not really friends. We all concentrate and 
work individually, no cooperation whatsoever 
(Male farmer, Kwesikrom, 20th April, 2019)
I think it is the nature of us, the Ahanta people. 
We do not like each other. We like to be 
individualistic instead of coming together to do 
things as a unit. (Male farmer, Kwesikrom, 20th 
April, 2019)
However, the evidence in this paper points to the 
importance of structural factors, in particular a lack 
of economic autonomy, rather than personal moral 
shortcomings in explaining the failure of collective 
action in these farming communities. As the 
quantitative study which preceded this project found, 
farmers’ ‘lack of autonomy shapes whom they sell to, 
at what price, and under what conditions' (Dzanku et 
al., 2020, p. 19). Although they are aware of the benefits 
of nurturing social networks and collective action, the 
economic constraints they face lead them to prioritise 
short-term survival strategies. This point is illustrated 
in their explanation for why they sell their produce at 
undesirable prices when they can get a higher price by 
collectively bargaining and withholding their harvest:
That is the problem of farmers. If we all decide 
not to sell and we will find other means to feed 
our families, all these problems would have 
ended. It will not work if we cannot do that. (Male 
FGD, Adum Dominase, 24th April, 2019)
We cannot get anyone to buy [our oil palm] and 
no car comes here to buy it. You might have 
taken loans here and there so you will certainly 
give them the oil palm in order to raise money to 
offset the loan. (Female FGD, Kwesikrom, 24th 
April, 2019)
This lack of autonomy undermines their ability to 
generate or nurture trust. Without trust, FBOs lack any 
means of ensuring the implementation of collective 
decisions requiring voluntaristic compliance. The 
resulting mistrust further engenders disinterest and 
apathy in the affairs of the association. Moreover, 
mistrust exacerbates the personal cost of cooperation 
for poorer farmers who experience a number of 
overlapping disadvantages that make it unlikely 
for them to benefit from participation in communal 
associations and collective action (Cleaver, 2005). The 
inability to make regular monetary contributions, and 
the time the associations take from their productive 
activities, creates barriers to effective participation and 
probable future benefits.
The situation imposes what Offer (2012) calls a ‘burden 
of reciprocity’ on the poor (see also Asante, 2018), who 
tend to lack the resources necessary to participate in 
the kinds of reciprocity that enable collective action. 
Specifically, poverty undermines the ability of individuals 
and households to maintain their social relations, which 
has negative implications on their ability to tap into the 
resources which could otherwise have been derived 
by participating in social support networks (Offer, 
2012). This can result in a vicious circle where wealth 
disparities widen in a community because the material 
prerequisites for participating in livelihood-enhancing 
collective schemes end up excluding exactly those who 
need such schemes the most.
Even though efforts at collective action failed in the 
study communities, wealthier farmers were not as 
negatively affected as others. Some organised into 
smaller groups to sell directly to the OPCs. Such 
groups were more reliable than the FBOs because 
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all members were able to meet the material cost of 
participation. For instance, better-off farmers are 
able to work together in a small group of similarly 
endowed farmers to meet the cost of transporting their 
produce to the company mills, thereby cutting out the 
aggregators or middlemen who offer lower prices than 
the companies.
I do not sell to agents. I sell directly to the 
companies. I was even awarded. I can show 
you my certificate. I have gotten so many 
awards. I got an award for the second best 
organiser of palm fruits. (Male farmer, Adum 
Dominase, April 19, 2019)
When we used to sell the oil palm to agents, 
we were not making much money, all that we 
got was used to pay the labourers and a few 
other things. But now that we sell to BOPP 
directly, we have taken the middleman’s profit 
for ourselves. Through that, our living standard 
has improved a little. (Female farmer, Adum 
Dominase, April 18, 2019)
With these benefits, wealthier farmers are further 
disincentivised from participating in collective action, 
which in turn weakens associational life. Besides the 
costs associated with organising groups and collective 
action, experiences and stories of a free-rider problem 
in associations dissuade rich farmers to engage in 
collective action. In the end the rich are better off, and 
the poor farmers remain poorer.
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Ghana’s highly commercialised oil palm value chain 
could catalyse national economic development, and 
provide a pathway out of poverty for smallholders 
engaged in the cultivation of the crop. However, this 
potential cannot be automatically realised, and studies 
suggest that wealthier smallholders or those with more 
asset holdings are better able to reap the benefits of 
agricultural commercialisation (Dzanku et al., 2020; 
Saha, Sabates-Wheeler and Thompson, 2021). For 
farmers without the material wherewithal to profitably 
6 CONCLUSION
Figure 6.1: Graphical presentation of argument
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participate in agricultural commercialisation, engaging 
in collective action through FBOs could help them 
to overcome some of the obstacles to successful 
commercialisation. By participating in collective action 
schemes, smallholders could gain access to credit, 
improved inputs, or even networks of social support. 
There is a strong potential for voluntary associations 
to contribute to the expansion of access to social 
protection among underserved rural populations, 
through their provision of informal insurance and social 
services to community members (Markelova et al., 
2009; Tirivayi et al., 2018). Thus, collective action is 
widely recognised as a viable pathway out of poverty 
for the agrarian poor.
However, poor farmers in our study communities 
lacked the ability to tap into the benefit expected to 
accrue from participation in collective action. In all five 
communities, FBOs were either weak or non-existent. 
Without any strong association, farmers are left with no 
organisational vehicle to collectively negotiate prices or 
acquire productivity-enhancing technology. Wealthier 
farmers are able to overcome this disadvantage by 
independently pooling resources with similarly endowed 
farmers to engage in income-enhancing activities, 
such as sharing the cost of direct sales to the OPCs 
or investing in processing technology (see Figure 6.1). 
This situation is particularly disadvantageous for poorer 
farmers because it hinders their ability to benefit from 
the advantages of agricultural commercialisation. In 
particular, a strong association or cooperative could 
have enabled them to overcome the lack of resources 
which limits their individual abilities for profitable market 
participation. This assumption is based on analytical 
insights from the social capital literature (Liverpool-
Tasie, Kuku and Ajibola, 2011; Yaméogo, Fonta 
and Wünscher, 2018), which postulates that social 
networks contain a rich store of resources which can 
be tapped into to improve individual lives and empower 
communities. However, our findings indicate that a 
lack of material autonomy predisposes poor farmers 
to short-term decisions, which may undermine their 
ability to engage in long-term cooperative activities. 
This can result in a vicious circle in which wealth 
disparities widen in a community because the materials 
prerequisites for participating in livelihood-enhancing 
collective schemes end up excluding exactly those who 
need such schemes the most.
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